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Educating students to become successful problem solvers has been a goal of education at
least since Dewey. However, the kinds of problems students do in school to practice their
problem-solving competence have little to do with the problems they will need to solve
in everyday settings. We briefly critique traditional conceptions of problem solving,
propose a different framework for theorizing problem solving, describe how innovative
curriculum design was informed by this new conception, present a case study of problem
solving in one of these curricula, and summarize research findings from our classrooms
that support the new conception of problem solving.
L’un des buts de l’enseignement a été, du moins depuis Dewey, de montrer aux élèves
à résoudre des problèmes. Toutefois, les problèmes que doivent résoudre les élèves à
l’école ne ressemblent guère à ceux qu’ils devront régler dans leur vie quotidienne. Les
auteurs présentent d’abord une brève critique des conceptions traditionnelles de la réso-
lution de problèmes, puis proposent une conception nouvelle. Ils décrivent comment cette
nouvelle conception les a guidés dans l’élaboration de programmes scolaires en sciences;
ils présentent d’ailleurs une étude de cas afin de donner un exemple des compétences
développées par les élèves dans ces programmes. Ils terminent leur article par une brève
présentation des principaux résultats de plusieurs recherches ethnographiques sur
l’apprentissage de la résolution de problèmes à l’école.
Preparing students for everyday life after school is one of education’s primary
goals. Learning to solve problems is a central concern in this endeavour. One
underlying assumption has been that students will transfer not only the specific
domain-related knowledge (such as mathematics) but also more general problem-
and solution-related skills. Understanding how people do problems and teaching
people ways to become better at doing problems have thus received much
attention from educational psychologists, cognitive scientists, and educators.
Models of self-regulated problem solving and learning abound (Butler & Winne,
1995; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Poissant, Poëllhuber, & Falardeau, 1994). Un-
fortunately, the models many authors provide are based on a limited class of
problems not highly relevant to becoming a citizen able to function in a complex
society. Numerous studies question the possibility for transfer of problem-solving
skills from this class of problems to those that occur in everyday settings (Lave,
1988).
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PROBLEM SOLVING IN LABORATORIES AND SCHOOLS
The tasks in traditional problem-solving literature are characterized by highly
structured and well-defined knowledge domains. Mazes, the Tower of Hanoi,
electrical circuits, river crossings, and radiation problems are standard tests of
problem-solving behaviour (A. L. Brown, 1994; Lave, 1988). The advantages of
using such tasks in psychological experiments are clear. The total number of
solution paths is enumerable. There is an identifiable “best,” “correct,” or “right”
solution which transforms the initial state to the final state. Any solution can be
mapped to allow comparison between the solver’s solution and the ideal solution.
This comparison can be quantified as the difference between actual and ideal
solutions (cf. Kanevsky & Rapagna, 1990). Disadvantages also arise: expert-
novice studies associated with these kinds of models of problem solving often
lead to characterizations of students in terms of deficits (as in “déficience dans
le processus métacognitif” [Poissant et al., 1994, p. 33]), and misconceptions
(Burbules & Linn, 1988) wherein responsibility for poor achievement is carried
by the student rather than the teaching-learning system as a whole. J. S. Brown
and Duguid (1992) argue that the “extremely influential dichotomy between
novices and experts . . . fails to appreciate the way in which expertise is a fluid,
social construction that is constantly subject to redefinition” (p. 172).
School problems posed by textbooks and teachers are typically of a similar
type. Algorithmic approaches lead to correct solutions. The students’ task is to
find that set of algorithms which guarantees the solution and the reward in the
form of a good grade. In school-like problems, the answers are already implicat-
ed, although they are withheld or concealed by the problem statement. What is
offered as knowable (the answer) is prefigured in advance such that actual
solution paths can be assessed against this ideal solution (Lynch, Livingston, &
Garfinkel, 1983; Morrison, 1981). Students’ tasks are to disclose what the texts
(or problems) hide and to find their way through the maze of possible states. The
most disconcerting research finding about school problem solving is that there
is virtually no carryover to everyday problem solving: there exists a chasm
between the problem-solving practices one needs to be successful in schools
versus those needed in everyday life (Lave, 1992).
The following example from mathematics illustrates the maze-like character
of school problems.1 Finding the roots of a function such as f(x) = x2 – 5x + 6
is a common problem at various grade levels. This problem can be framed and
solved in many ways. Problem frames include factoring a polynomial, finding the
roots of a polynomial, solving a word problem, or solving an equation. The
solutions can also be framed in different ways, including numbers (2, 3), alge-
braic statements ([x – 2] * [x – 3] or [x – 2], [x – 3]), a sentence in response to
the question in the word problem, or a line on a graphing calculator. Among the
possible solution paths, copying, guessing, and calculator-based solutions (New-
ton’s method, graphing) are typically forbidden, and students’ solutions and
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answer formats are compared against those currently favoured by the curriculum.
Thus, when the current topic is “completing the square,” only one of the different
methods receives full credit; if the current topic is factoring or using quadratic
equations, other solutions provide the standards against which students’ work is
compared. The students’ problem is not to find a solution (as would be required
in everyday life), but to find the solution legitimated by the teacher. This solution
is not self-evident but has to be taken from other cues students receive from
teachers. It is not surprising that students get lost in the maze of problems,
solutions, and answer formats. Questions such as “Am I on the right track?,” “Is
this right so far?” and “I’m lost; what do I have to do?” are perfectly reasonable
in such circumstances. They are also indicative of their tasks’ character. Students
find themselves in mazes and, rather than erring for too long, they ask for
guidance from teachers who know the accepted path through the mazes; teachers
hold Ariadne’s thread.
We are not alone in comparing running mazes and school problem-solving. In
her presidential address at an annual meeting of the American Educational
Research Association, A. L. Brown (1994) explicitly linked behaviourist psy-
chology and its experiments that asked children to run mazes (just like rats) with
current schooling and testing practices.
FROM CLASSICAL TO SITUATED PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Traditional cognitive science (and artificial intelligence) has successfully applied
linear models of problem solving to the solution of well-structured word prob-
lems in introductory physics or tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi.2 Many cogni-
tive scientists have adopted linear models such as that originally proposed by
Dewey, and revised and popularized by George Polya in the late 1950s. How-
ever, most problems in everyday situations — whether in scientific laboratories,
engineering firms, or supermarkets — are not linear. Numerous researchers have
begun to realize that linear models fail to account for everyday problem solving
because they are ill-suited to the dynamic and generally chaotic conditions of the
workplace (Anderson, 1990; Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991; Heath & Luff, 1993;
Lave, 1988; Schön, 1983; Suchman, 1987). This failure arises because linear and
rationalistic problem-solving models were derived from highly structured sets of
signals and cues, and in very limited domains that were well known by the
solver. Scandinavian designers of computer tools for the workplace, who spent
much time analyzing the competencies of skilled and experienced workers,
pointed out the relationship between rationalistic (linear) approaches to problem
solving and deskilling in the work force (Ehn, 1992; Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991).
These analysts argue that deskilling is the result of (a) organizing workplace
tasks based on inflexible algorithmic procedures, and (b) organizing workplaces
in top-down fashion to legitimate algorithmic (pseudo) problem solving. Experi-
enced teachers recognize that “deskilling” also occurs in many science and
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mathematics classrooms where students ask for “the right answer” rather than
choosing from a panoply of problem frames, answers, and solution processes.
In response to rationalistic models’ failure to account for problem solving in
everyday settings, the most common non-linear models of problem solving are
cyclical (Starling, 1992). The models proposed by Carver and Scheier (1990) or
Poissant et al. (1994), with their various feedback loops for self-regulation,
belong to this class of problem-solving models. However, studies of everyday
activity show that problem solving is not modelled well by such cyclical proces-
ses (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour, 1992; Lave, 1988; Scribner, 1986; Sørensen &
Levold, 1992). Furthermore, linear and cyclic problem-solving models based on
individual mental processes do not model the situated, distributed, and embodied
nature of knowing; they embody myths about the rationality of problem solving
in everyday (normal or scientific) activity (J. S. Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989;
diSessa, 1993; Hutchins, 1991; Lave, 1993; Pea, 1993; Scardamalia & Bereiter,
1994; Suchman & Trigg, 1993; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Winograd
& Flores, 1986). Although traditional cognitive scientists recognize differences
between everyday problem solving and the (pseudo) problem solving described
by their models, they treat these differences as minor caveats that can be fixed
by adding extra components to their models. Hutchins (1995) contends that such
minor changes cannot remedy the problems of a modular approach to human
cognition that “privileges abstract properties of isolated individual minds” (p.
354). For researchers who study problem solving by scientists and ordinary
people in everyday life situations, these differences require complete abandon-
ment of cyclical models.
PROBLEM SOLVING IN EVERYDAY LIFE
The following example from our own research illustrates the flexibility with
which people frame and solve problems in everyday life; everyday problem
solving is neither linear nor cyclical. Geena, an elementary teacher in one of our
studies (McGinn, 1995), began to bake a batch of cookies as one of a set of tasks
to find out about mathematics in teachers’ everyday lives. She read from a
written recipe and added the ingredients to her bowl, mixing as she went. As she
kneaded the ingredients together, she looked at the cookie dough with an expres-
sion of concern and remarked, “This seems awfully dry.” She turned back to the
recipe for confirmation and explanation of this problem; she re-read the ingredi-
ent list (twice) and the directions, trying to puzzle out the problem. After a few
minutes, she turned her focus from “I wonder why?” to “What am I going to use
this for?” She looked around her kitchen, deep in thought, then announced:
Well, it’s dry, it’s cookie. OK, this is what I’m going to do. I’m going to get my pan and
I’m going to put. . . . I think I’ll cut up those apples [pointing to a bowl of apples at the
edge of her countertop] ’cause I wanted to make some applesauce or something out of
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them because they were going bad at school. So I think I’ll put some apples in. Now
should I put this on the bottom? Or maybe I’ll do a double layer. I’ll put some on the
bottom and then I’ll put some apples and then I’ll put some of this on the top.
She proceeded in this fashion to create delicious apple squares.
This episode shows creativity, flexibility (she abandons the original problem),
reorganization (she reframes the affordances of the environment), and a success-
ful resolution. It shows the flexibility with which people frame their problems in
everyday out-of-school situations. There is ample evidence that such problem
solving seldom occurs in schools. More importantly, there is evidence that adults
who are efficient problem solvers in everyday life revert to inflexible problem-
solving algorithms on school-like problems (see, for example, Lave, 1988).
Framing problems and enacting plans are central to problem solving in everyday
situations.
Framing problems. In everyday situations, it is often unclear what the problem
is: problems change, problems are sometimes preceded by solutions, and prob-
lems are abandoned in light of new developments (Cohen, March, & Olsen,
1979; Lave, 1988; Sørensen & Levold, 1992). The case of Geena shows some
interesting dimensions of problem solving. Her initial problem was to bake a
batch of cookies. At some point, she decided that the dough was not suited for
baking cookies, a decision that already demanded a lot of experience not avail-
able to most novice or inexperienced cooks. She checked a few of her steps and
measurements against the recipe (although it was not entirely clear if she went
through the elaborate checking procedure as a result of the researcher’s presence)
and then decided to change the problem to make apple squares instead. However,
this new problem arose from Geena’s interaction with her environment such that
the apples which at first were irrelevant to the problem (i.e., they would not have
entered the situation definition as proposed by Poissant et al. [1994]) became a
major factor in her resolution. Whereas the squares were a triple success — her
co-workers found them delicious, their history made for a good laugh, and they
made use of some overripe apples — Geena would have failed in most traditional
school situations (home economics or mathematics), because she did not produce
the cookies originally planned.
Geena’s problem solving was entirely consistent with that found in assess-
ments of successful engineering firms. Here, there are “disorderly problem-
solving negotiations, in which different kinds of knowledge are contraposed and
checked, and where the outcome also depends on the persuasive abilities of the
engineers involved. . . . Consequently, what counts as relevant expertise and
equipment is rather open” (Sørensen & Levold, 1992, p. 27). To frame and solve
such problems, theoretical knowledge is almost never sufficient to make things
work. Although situated, tacit, and practical knowledge built up through experi-
ence are key ingredients to success (Faulkner, 1994; Schön, 1983), they cannot
guarantee success: “Neither tacit nor formal knowledge permits [photocopier]
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technicians to predict success in all cases; a working machine is the only real
demonstration that one’s knowledge was sufficient” (Orr, 1990, p. 170). To help
clarify what is a problem, even highly trained economists, scientists, or techni-
cians use stories instead of formal analysis (Bruner, 1986; Orr, 1990). For
example, photocopier technicians, in their search for inspiration to deal with
ill-structured problem situations, tell stories; “the hardest part of diagnosis is
making sense out of a fundamentally ambiguous set of facts, and this is done
through a narrative process to produce a coherent account” (Orr, 1990, p. 186).
Plans. In everyday life, plans are not as determinate as they appear in self-
regulated problem-solving models (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Poissant et al.,
1994). Rather, plans are merely rough guides that never uniquely determine
future actions (Chapman, 1991; Suchman, 1987). Our example of Geena shows
that her original plan (the recipe) was not sufficient to guarantee the cookies she
had set out to bake. But she was flexible enough to modify her goal. Rather than
making her new plan as explicit as the recipe, she continued, based on her
situated knowledge of baking, to produce apple squares. The structure of the
activity “Geena-baking-cookies-in-her-kitchen” arose from the interaction of
Geena and the setting. In the same vein, a recent television documentary about
the repair of the Hubble Space Telescope pointed out that despite extensive
preparations (more than 1000 hours), astronauts knew there were “millions” of
things that could go wrong once they were actually doing the repairs. What made
the astronauts’ actions so special was that they situationally resolved the contin-
gent (unforeseen) problems that materialized in the course of their mission.
Similarly, the extensive manuals photocopier technicians have as resources for
doing their work are frequently insufficient to return broken photocopiers to an
operational state (Orr, 1990). Thus, even in paradigm cases of planning, solution-
related actions are inherently unspecifiable in advance. Furthermore, planning and
executing plans are presented as essential components in most models of prob-
lem-solving behaviour (e.g., Poissant et al., 1994). In real-life problems, planning
is often made unnecessary by providing problem solvers with appropriate tech-
nologies (Pea, 1993) or by changing structures of the setting in ways that unload
thinking into the environment (Kirsh, 1995).
Our own examples and those from the literature show that problem solving is
much more complex than cyclical problem-solving models suggest: solutions may
precede problems, theoretical and practical knowledge is insufficient to frame
problems, plans are not determinants of actions, and so forth. The technical
rationality embedded in cyclical models appears to lead to the inflexible problem
solving against which we would like to guard. We therefore question the practice
of teaching students to solve problems according to models inappropriate for
dealing with everyday situations, especially in light of educational goals to
develop knowledge usable across contexts. We propose a different direction for
planning instruction. Rather than basing curriculum design on problem-solving
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models of limited applicability, we base our designing on the findings of problem
solving in out-of-school situations.
OPEN INQUIRY: REALISTIC PROBLEM SOLVING IN SCHOOLS
New perspectives, like new theories, should be not only plausible and intelligible
but fruitful, in that they suggest new ways of designing instruction. Thus, new
perspectives have to show new avenues for understanding learning or teaching,
and to provide frameworks for changing curriculum. We have used the foregoing
findings of problem solving in the workplace and other everyday settings to
design new learning environments dubbed “open-inquiry” and “open-design”
environments. Our designs of alternative problem-solving environments in
schools have also built on students’ complaints that schools or universities do not
prepare them for the complexities of everyday life (for example, for teaching)
and parallel complaints from employers of recent graduates. What kinds of tasks
let students engage in problem solving of realistic complexity? So far, we and
our collaborating teacher colleagues have designed learning environments in
which elementary students designed and built models of bridges and complex
machines (Roth, 1996); middle-school students developed research agendas to
investigate real biomes (Roth & Bowen, 1995); and high school students de-
signed solar-powered water heaters (Roth, MacFarlane, & Nicholson, 1992),
experiments on complex motion phenomena (Roth, 1993), or a curriculum on
electricity for younger children (Roth, 1995). As students pursued their goals,
they learned a lot of science and mathematics, more, in fact, than the curriculum
prescribed. More importantly, they learned to structure their environment to
achieve the (sometimes emergent) goals they set for themselves.
A CASE STUDY OF PROBLEM SOLVING DURING OPEN INQUIRY
Jamie and Miles were two Grade 8 students involved in open-inquiry science.
Their teacher had asked his students to stake out a 40-m2 research site and to
spend 10 weeks finding out as much as they could about biotic and abiotic
aspects of the site. They had complete freedom to choose how they would frame
their research questions, design investigations, collect data, and present their
results (e.g., data table, graph, or maps). During their investigations, their teacher
assisted them on a just-in-time and as-needed basis. The core requirement for
students was that they make convincing cases for their research questions, design,
and results; they had to defend their work in small groups with students from
other research teams.
Based on their previous research at the site and their emerging questions,
Jamie and Miles decided to investigate whether there was a relationship between
the abiotic variable of light intensity and the biotic variables of plant density and
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plant growth. In their field site, they selected may apples as the plant to investi-
gate.
What is an appropriate average light intensity? At the end of their previous
investigation, they had established some baseline data on the density of may
apples and the average plant height in three locations of their research site. Now,
they returned to measure the growth and light intensity, and to update their
earlier plant density measurements. Jamie wanted to sample the light intensity
once in each of three 1-m2 plots. Miles noticed that light was unevenly distrib-
uted across the plots, and raised this concern.
1. Miles: But the thing is, that light, half of our area doesn’t even have any light.
2. Jamie: Well, we can measure in that area [points to centre of one plot].
3. Miles: Yea, but in order to get a fair comparison you have to measure every single
little wee bit in the area. What do you think we should do?
4. Jamie: Well, let’s do the four corners of it, and the middle, like do 5 spots.
Miles had formulated a problem: If they followed Jamie’s plan, they would bias
the light intensity measurement (line 1). However, Miles realized that his own
suggestion for dealing with this problem, “to measure every single little wee bit,”
was unreasonable. They did not have the means to measure the total amount of
light falling on each 1-m2 plot. Jamie responded with the proposition that they
take five measurements, one in each corner and one in the middle. They would
average the five readings as a measure of the light falling onto each area. Here,
the solution to the problem Miles had framed arose from the interaction of the
two students. Miles’ own solution would have been too labor intensive with the
means they had at hand; Jamie’s proposal constituted a compromise solution to
the problem they had framed. Here, Jamie and Miles not only framed the prob-
lem and negotiated and arrived at a solution, but they also evaluated the solution
as appropriate for their current purposes.
What is an appropriate protocol for measuring light intensity? Jamie and
Miles continued to frame and resolve problems as they worked toward their
investigative goals. For example, immediately after the previous episode, another
problem emerged from their interaction. Jamie had repeatedly measured the light
intensity at ground level in each of the 1-m2 plots. As he took another measure-
ment, a may apple plant shaded his light meter. He reported this measurement
to Miles, the current recorder, but emphasized that the light meter had been
shaded by the plant.
5. Jamie: In this corner it [the light meter] is kind of shaded by the plant, 300 [foot
candles] . . . got that? [Measures light intensity at ground level.] This [light
meter] is really shaded by the plant.
6. Miles: Put it above the plant.
7. Jamie: I guess. Another 500, and now the middle [measures at ground level, then
moves meter above the plant], to get a better reading, 425.
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In this episode, Miles suggested measuring light intensity at a height above the
leaves of the largest plant. Initially, Jamie did not react. But when he moved to
the next sampling site, he framed the same problem again. He recognized the
interference of leaves as a recurrent issue and moved the tool as Miles had
suggested. While taking yet another measurement, he remarked, “OK, I didn’t
think of the plant height, I have to do it again, now it’s 1100 [foot candles],
OK.” From this moment on, Jamie’s measurement technique was entrenched. He
held the light meter at the same height whether there was a plant or not; and he
repeated all previous measurements.
Is 2000 footcandles a meaningful measurement? Unlike in traditional labo-
ratory exercises where students conduct investigations without understanding
(a) the reasons for collecting particular data, (b) the quality of the data they
collect, or (c) the problems underlying the measuring process, students in the
open-inquiry learning environment continually problematize these issues (Roth,
1994). The following transcript illustrates this ongoing concern for understanding.
Here, Miles problematized a particular elevated light intensity (lines 8, 10).
8. Miles: 910, so that one has the most.
9. Jamie: That’s ’cause of the 2000.
10. Miles: Because of the big 2000. [pensive] Doesn’t make any sense!
11. Jamie: It does, though. This one looks the darkest, and that’s what you had meas-
ured.
12. Miles: Is that area [points] lighter than that area [points]?
13. Jamie: Yeah. Look how light it is in the middle there and then on the sides.
After Miles framed the problem of the high measurement, the two collaboratively
assessed the situation. Jamie was able to allay Miles’ concerns by pointing out
that the area with the high light intensity was in fact the brightest (lines 11, 13).
Miles’ questions directed their inquiry into the meaningfulness of 910 foot
candles as an average measurement of light intensity.
What is the average plant growth when there are additional plants? In the
end, Miles and Jamie had collected all the data they needed for their purposes.
They constructed a table into which they transferred their data (Table 1). Where-
as they had little difficulty calculating the average density of may apples in their
plots, they turned average growth rates into a problem. Since their baseline
measurements, the number of plants had increased in one of their plots. Simul-
taneously, the average height of the plants in this plot had decreased. They
immediately framed this as a problem: There was negative growth! In the course
of their discussion, Miles suggested looking at total plant height rather than
average height. He suggested that this way they could assess how much addi-
tional height there was over their baseline measurements. Again, they framed
their problem and constructed a suitable solution.
As part of the larger study, we also wanted to find out if there were differ-
ences between students’ problem solving when they framed problems on their
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TABLE 1
Miles and Jamie’s Data Table to Represent Plant Growth
Height of Plant (cm)
Day Plant # Area 1 Area 2
1 1 17 19
1 2 20 22
1 3 23 16
2 1 18 20
2 2 21 23
2 3 24 17
2 4 5
2 5 12
own versus when the problems were constructed by the teacher. In one of the
tests we conducted to answer this question, we used Jamie and Miles’ problem,
turned it into a story, and added their data. We then distributed this “problem”
in three classes of Grade 8 students engaged in similar fieldwork. We found that
38% of the students calculated the total growth of all plants in each zone to
determine average growth per plant. A partially mathematical approach was used
by 29% of the students: these students first compared growth rates of the existing
plants (which were equal) and then reasoned that Area 2 showed more growth
because of the added plants. Some students (19%) disregarded the new plants
and indicated that growth rates in the two areas were the same. The remaining
14% of the students responded with answers which did not compare growth
rates. Whereas our videotapes and students’ worksheets underscored the sophisti-
cation in students’ approaches to our word problems, we also had to acknowl-
edge that these word problems severely constrained the flexibility with which the
same students framed and solved problems as part of their fieldwork (cf. Roth
& Bowen, 1993).
Assessment of problem solving. Our analysis of these and many other episodes
from the fieldwork of Jamie, Miles, and their peers led us to the following
conclusions. Problems the students recognized as real emerged from their on-
going activity as they pursued previously set goals. In the course of pursing these
goals, conflicts and dilemmas arose that sought solution. The students recognized
these conflicts and dilemmas as authentic. Determining an appropriate and de-
fensible average light intensity, height for holding the light meter, or magnitude
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of measurements were dilemmas that engaged students, who owned the dilemmas
and their resolution. Jamie and Miles averaged five measurements in each plot
because they considered this a fairer comparison across plots; they changed their
measurement protocol in terms of how high to hold the light meter, and repeated
all previous measurements because they were concerned with the shading; and
they assessed the feasibility of a high light intensity because they wanted to
understand. In contrast, whenever we presented word problems, students’ work
changed, even though these problems arose from the contexts of students’
inquiries. Jamie and Miles’ science and mathematics learning as part of their
fieldwork was situated and dilemma-driven; they “ ‘mucked about’ with
quantitative dilemmas” (Lave, 1992, p. 80). Their own problem setting and
solution finding involved the total available resources of the activity: students,
tools, the setting for their investigations, and their goals. Students saw our word
problems as puzzles that hid the kind of contextual information to which they
had access during fieldwork. As a result, the problem-solving competencies we
observed with our word problems were lower than those we observed during
students’ fieldwork.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our studies of problem solving in these environments revealed a number of
striking and, to traditionalists, unexpected findings. First, students from Grades
4 through 12 learned not only to cope with ill-structured and ill-defined problem-
solving tasks, but to exploit the associated interpretive flexibility of the problems.
Furthermore, they became very proficient in material-related (using instruments,
computers, statistics programs, and related tools) and symbolic scientific practices
(language, graphing, other mathematizations). With time, they built research
agendas and developed experiments that simultaneously investigated multiple
dependent and multiple independent variables (Roth & Bowen, 1993; Roth &
Roychoudhury, 1993). We observed that many student experiments began with
everyday out-of-school experiences, and many in-school investigations had direct
applications to out-of-school life. Through their problem-solving activities, these
students partially overcame the typical gap between in-school and out-of-school
activities. We concluded that, for our students,
well-structured problems did not exist. What was to become a problem always arose from
the interplay between the participants, the activity, and the context. These problems were
unpredictable both in their form and [in] their content. Our participants had to frame these
problems on their own before they could resolve them, that is, they had to impose their
own meaning to structure the phenomena. . . . From a constructivist view, such problem-
atic situations provide favorable conditions for learning, because the problem solver is
facing conditions for which no known procedures are available. (Roth, 1994, p. 216)
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Our case studies of problem solving in open-inquiry environments showed that
much like the studies on everyday problem solving cited earlier (Lave, 1988;
McGinn, 1995; Sørensen & Levold, 1993; Suchman, 1987), classical cyclical
models such as that of Poissant et al. (1994) did not account for our students’
problem- and solution-related activities. Rather than running mazes, our students
engaged in problem solving where (a) goals were endogenous to the constitution
of problems, (b) problems were owned by students rather than given in norma-
tive, decontextualized form by external agents, and (c) solution processes were
meaningful and purposeful, constituting truly constructivist activities (Roth,
1994).
CONCLUSIONS
Given that students are to engage in problem solving, educators need to make
decisions about the kinds of problems students ought to solve. Educators there-
fore need to ask whether they want to educate maze runners, or to prepare
citizens able to cope with the complexities of everyday life; that is, educators
face moral questions about educational aims (Pea, 1993). Linear and cyclic
problem-solving models lead people to algorithmic procedures rather than to the
dynamic and adaptive actions necessary in a generally chaotic world. Our past
experience with students and employers, who felt that school and university
instruction did not prepare graduates for the challenges of everyday life, clearly
affected our decision to include open-ended problem solving in ill-structured
domains as a significant portion of our curriculum. The discontinuity between
in-school and out-of-school problem solving can only be overcome when students
engage in schools in problem solving resembling that required out of schools:
“Part of knowing how to learn and solve complex problems involves knowing
how to create and exploit social networks and the expertise of others, and to
deftly use the features of the physical and media environments to one’s advan-
tage” (Pea, 1993, p. 75). Our studies of students’ problem solving on ill-struc-
tured tasks support such assumptions. Thus, the design of problem-solving tasks
should ultimately be driven by the potential benefits for students rather than by
ease of information transmission and task evaluation. The merit of designing
tasks on the basis of models that account for only a very restricted and simple
class of problems is highly questionable. Educators need curricular tasks that
provide students with practice in the flexible problem framing and solving
demanded by complex everyday problems.
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NOTES
1 Our present critique is concerned only with the question of “Which answer do students provide?”
rather than with the (for some readers, more pressing) question of “Why do we teach factoring
squares?”
2 Recent work in both cognitive science and artificial intelligence has begun to recognize that
intelligent problem solving and cognition more generally have an emergent character and arise
from the interaction of agents and their settings (e.g., Agre, 1995; Chapman, 1991; Hutchins,
1995; Kirsh, 1995).
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